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ABSTRACT
With rapid increase in online information consumption, especially
via social media sites, there have been concerns on whether people
are getting selective exposure to a biased subset of the information
space, where a user is receiving more of what she already knows,
and thereby potentially getting trapped in echo chambers or filter
bubbles. Even though such concerns are being debated for some
time, it is not clear how to quantify such echo chamber effect.
In this position paper, we introduce Information Segregation (or
Informational Segregation) measures, which follow the long lines
of work on residential segregation. We believe that information
segregation nicely captures the notion of exposure to different
information by different population in a society, and would help in
quantifying the extent of social media sites offering selective (or
diverse) information to their users.
1 INTRODUCTION
As increasing number of users are consuming information online,
often via social media sites like Facebook and Twitter, there have
been concerns regarding the content quality [1, 9], and the pos-
sibility of biases in the information people are getting exposed
to [6–8, 10]. In such sites, people tend to be connected with other
like-minded users out of homophily [2, 20], and create their own
interest groups [4, 5]. Thus, there have been concerns that individ-
ual users can have selective exposure to information which closely
matches their own views, and may not have enough exposure to
differing views [10], and such echo chambers or filter bubbles [21]
may lead to the polarization of society [11, 17].
However, two competing theories of opinion polarization have
been proposed in earlier works [16]. One school of thought assumes
that opinions are reinforced when likeminded individuals interact
with each other [11, 14, 17].Whereas, other researchers have argued
that exposure to differing views and their subsequent rejections lead
to polarization [3, 18]. Polarization can be thought as a measure of
the ideological state of the population in a society, which is difficult
to quantify in general. Also, it is not explicitly clear what constitutes
the ideal notion of the depolarized state of a society.
In this position paper, we argue that an alternative option would
be to consider the access to different types of information by mem-
bers of a society. For example, within a population with multiple
parties operating, it is but natural that political opinion would be
fragmented. However, it is highly desirable that the entire popu-
lation have access to the same information / knowledge and they
take informed decision to follow different paths. In other words,
the bigger issue here is whether different groups of people are having
access to similar kind of information or not, where groups may be
Figure 1: Basis for computing residential segregation: bipar-
tite matching between people and residential units in a city.
formed based on predefined demographics (e.g., gender, race, age,
income level) or derived features (e.g., political leaning) of people.
Figure 2: Basis for computing information segregation: bi-
partite matching between people and information units.
To investigate this issue, we borrow ideas from the past litera-
ture on residential segregation. A large number of research works
have considered the bipartite matching between different groups
of people and the urban units where they reside (as shown in Fig-
ure 1), and proposed different measures to quantify geographical
segregation of different groups [12, 13]. In a seminal work, Massey
and Denton [19] identified five distinct dimensions of residential
segregation:
(i) Evenness is the degree to which groups are distributed propor-
tionately across areal units in an urban area.
(ii) Exposure is the extent to which members of different groups
share common residential areas.
(iii)Concentration refers to the degree of a group’s agglomeration
in urban space.
(iv) Centralization is the extent to which group members reside
towards the center of an urban area, and
(v) Clustering measures the degree to which different groups are
located adjacent to one another.
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Then, they grouped different segregation measures along these
five dimensions. Note that some segregation measures are relative
between two groups, whereas others are absolute measures of the
segregation of one particular group.
Following this line of work, in this paper, we present the notion
of Information Segregation (or Informational Segregation).
Similar to Figure 1, we consider another bipartite matching between
different groups of people and the information units they have
access to (shown in Figure 2). Then utilizing this mapping, we can
compute information segregation to measure whether different
groups in a society are having access to similar kind of information
or not.
However, there are two primary aspects where the mapping
between people and information units differs from the mapping be-
tween people and residential units: (i) residential segregation is com-
puted over a two-dimensional geographical space, whereas informa-
tion segregation needs to be computed over a n-dimensional topic
space (n = 1 in Figure 2, but in general, n ≥ 1), and (ii) one person
may have access to multiple information units, which needs to be
accounted for while computing information segregation; whereas,
one person is considered to be permanently staying in only one res-
idential unit. To account for people accessing different information
units, we use the notion of fractional personhood [22]. For an
information unit i , we consider the personhood of 1 for everyone
who have access to only i , personhood of 12 for them who have
access to i and another information unit, and so on.
In this paper, we propose five measures of information segrega-
tion analogous to the residential segregation measures discussed
earlier, by considering the fractional personhoods of people from
different groups. Then, as a proof of concept, we measure the in-
formation segregation of US-based Facebook users as evident from
how they follow different news media pages on Facebook. Our
investigation reveals that Hispanic users are accessing information
more evenly across political spectrum; whereas Asian Americans
have highest information segregation among all racial groups. Simi-
larly, we also looked at how users having different political leanings
are accessing contrary views. We found that moderately conserva-
tive leaning users tend to get information more evenly across the
spectrum; whereas, extremely conservative leaning users are most
segregated among others.
The information segregation measures proposed in this paper
can also be used to evaluate the role of search / recommender
systems for exposing different types of information to a large popu-
lation. We believe that in future, greater emphasis should be put on
designing more responsible search / recommender systems which
limit information segregation to acceptable limits.
2 MEASURES OF INFORMATION
SEGREGATION
In this section, we introduce different measures of information
segregation, considering the five distinct dimensions as identified
by Messey and Denton [19] for residential segregation.
I. Evenness
The evenness measure of information segregation captures how uni-
formly members of a particular group have access to different units
in the n-dimensional information space. Figure 3 shows an example
Figure 3: Yellow group gets information more evenly than
Purple group.
scenario where members of Yellow group have access to all four in-
formation units; whereas, members of Purple group have access to
only two units. Therefore, Yellow group in Figure 3 have more even
information access than Purple group. Massey and Denton [19]
discussed five different measures of residential evenness (including
both relative and absolute measures). For brevity, we are defining
only one measure of absolute evenness of a group, which is the
complement of Gini Coefficient [12].
Gini coefficient GA measures the unevenness of a particular
group A, by capturing the mean absolute difference between the
personhoods ofA having access to different information units. Then,
Information Evenness IEA can be computed as
IEA = 1 −GA = 1 −
∑m
i=1
∑m
j=1, j,i |ai − aj |
2 · atotal · a′total
where ai is the sum of personhoods belonging to group A who get
information i , atotal is the size of groupA in the overall population,
m is the number of information units, and a′total is the number of
people in the overall population who do not belong to group A. IEA
varies between 0 to 1, higher the value, the group has more even
information access.
Figure 4: Joint exposure between Purple group and Yellow
group is higher than the joint exposure between Purple
group and Pink group.
II. Joint Exposure
Joint exposure quantifies the extent to which members of two groups
get jointly exposed to the same information. In Figure 4, members of
Purple and Yellow groups are jointly exposed to three out of four
information units; whereas, members of Purple and Pink groups
are jointly exposed to only one unit. Therefore, in Figure 4, Purple
and Yellow groups have higher joint exposure compared to Purple
and Pink groups.
2
Figure 5: Yellow group is more concentrated than Purple
group.
Again using the notion of personhoods, joint information expo-
sure between groups A and B is computed as
J IEAB =
m∑
i=1
ai
atotal
· bi
totali
where ai , atotal , andm are as defined earlier, bi is sum of person-
hoods belonging to B who get information i , and totali is sum of all
personhoods having access to information i . J IEAB varies between
0 to 1, higher the value, A and B have more common exposure.
III. Concentration
Concentration of a group A refers to the relative amount of topical
space that A have access to. Every information unit may not have
similar topical density (or number of information sources, etc), with
some units having more topics mapping into it, compared to other
information units. For example, in Figure 5, red and blue units
consist of higher number of topics than blueish and reddish grey
units. Therefore, even though Yellow and Purple groups have access
to same number of units (hence have same evenness), Yellow group
would be considered more concentrated (i.e., more segregated) as it
has access to fewer topics. Information concentration is captured
by the metric Delta [15]:
DELA =
1
2
m∑
i=1
ai
atotal
· ni
ntotal
where ai , atotal , andm are already defined, ni is number of topics
in information unit i , and ntotal is number of topics overall.
Figure 6: Purple group is more centralized than Yellow
group.
IV. Centralization
Compared to the geographical context, identifying the center of an
information space is tricky, and may not be always possible. Cen-
trality may be computed by considering centroids in a dimension-
reduced topical space, or by measuring it over networks induced
by information units and their topical or preference similarity. In
scenarios where the notion of information center is defined, cen-
tralization between two groups A and B refers to how the information
Figure 7: Purple group is more clustered than Yellow group.
units that A and B have access to are distributed around the center.
For example, in Figure 6, if we assume the blueish grey unit to be
the center, then although Yellow and Purple groups have same even-
ness and concentration measures, Purple group is more centralized
than Yellow group. Formally, Centralization Index [13] can be
measured as
CIAB =
m∑
i=1
ai−1bi −
m∑
i=1
aibi−1
where information units are sorted based on their distance from the
center, and ai , bi , andm are as defined earlier.CIAB varies between
−1 to 1, positive value indicating A is more centralized than B.
V. Clustering
The final dimension of information segregation is the degree to
which members of a group A have access to information clusters,
i.e., whether the different types of information received by A are close
to each other in the information space. In Figure 7, both Purple and
Yellow groups have access to two information units, and have the
same evenness and concentration scores. However, as the infor-
mation units Purple group have access to are close to each other,
according to clustering measure, it is more segregated than Yellow
group . We can formally define information clustering as
ICA =
(∑mi=1 aiatotal ∑mj=1 e−di jaj ) − (atotalm2 ∑mi=1∑mj=1 e−di j )
(∑mi=1 aiatotal ∑mj=1 e−di j totalj ) − (atotalm2 ∑mi=1∑mj=1 e−di j )
where ai , atotal , totalj , andm are as defined earlier, and di j is the
distance between information units i and j . ICA varies from 0 to 1.
3 INFORMATION SEGREGATION AMONG
US-BASED FACEBOOK USERS
Next, we attempt to quantify information segregation of Facebook
users in the US. Towards that end, we specifically focus on news
media pages in Facebook, and measure information segregation
with respect to how different groups of users follow these pages.
Dataset Gathered
We queried Facebook search with the term ‘US news media’ to
collect US related news media pages in Facebook, and found more
than 2.5K Facebook pages for that query. Then using Facebook’s
ad submission web page (facebook.com/ads/manager/creation), we
collected the composition of gender, race and political leanings of
the followers of these media pages. We acknowledge the limitation
that the retrieved pages may not be representative of all US media
pages, and we would expand the corpus in future work.
Mapping Facebook Pages to Information Units
To quantify information segregation, we focus on 1-dimensional
political information space, and divide it into five information units:
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Figure 8: Information segregation between different groups along two dimensions: evenness of (a) different racial groups,
(b) different political groups, and (c) joint exposure of very conservative leaning people (VC) with other political groups.
Very Conservative (VC), Conservative (C), Moderate (M), Lib-
eral (L), and Very Liberal (VL). Then, we map different news
pages on Facebook to one of these five information units by con-
sidering the political leanings of the followers of these pages. For a
page P , if the fraction of followers leaning towards respective politi-
cal ideologies are denoted as fVC , fC , fM , fL , and fV L respectively,
then we measure the political leaning of P (LeaninдP ) as a weighted
sum of the political leaning of its audience. More specifically,
LeaninдP = −1 · fVC + −0.5 · fVC + 0 · fM + 0.5 · fL + 1 · fV L
If LeaninдP is between −0.1 to +0.1, we map P to information
unitM ; for LeaninдP between 0.1 to 0.5, P is mapped to L and for
LeaninдP > 0.5, we map P to VL. Similarly, we map P to C or VC
if −0.5 ≤ LeaninдP < −0.1 and LeaninдP < −0.5 respectively.
Computing the Personhood Scores
After mapping every page to one of the information units, we try
to gather the cumulative number of followers for a particular unit.
However, Facebook doesn’t allow us to get the follower size for
a combination of more than 400 Facebook pages. Therefore, we
randomly select 400 pages from the set of 2.5K+ news media pages,
map them to their corresponding units, and gather the demograph-
ics of the followers of pages belonging to every information unit.
As some users may follow Facebook pages belonging to multiple
units (for example, follow both conservative and liberal leaning
pages), we need to accurately account for these overlaps in infor-
mation access. As mentioned earlier, we use the notion of fractional
personhood in this regard. Therefore, instead of considering the
number of followers of pages in a particular unit, we consider the
sum of personhoods for pages in every information unit.
For every unit i , the sum of personhoods N ∗i is computed as
N ∗i = [N (S)−N (S\i)]+
1
2
∑
j ∈(S\i)
N (i∩j)+13
∑
j ∈(S\i)
∑
k ∈(S\i\j)
N (i∩j∩k)+....
where S is the set of all information units {VC,C,M,L,VL} and
N (x) gives the number of followers of pages in unit(s) x .
Information Segregation among Racial Groups
Facebook ad interface returns four racial categories for the users:
Caucasian,AfricanAmerican,AsianAmerican, andHispanic.
For every information unit, we compute the personhoods belong-
ing to each race, and then measure information segregation among
them. Figure 8(a) shows the evenness of different racial groups.
We can see in Figure 8(a) that Hispanics have most even access
to different political information units; whereas, Asian Americans
have most uneven access to political information units.
Information Segregation between Political Groups
Similar to the racial categories, we also computed the personhoods
w.r.t. different political leanings for every information unit, and
then measure the information segregation among these groups.
Figure 8(b) shows that conservative leaning users tend to get infor-
mation evenly from information units; whereas, very conservative
leaning users have most uneven access to different units. Then to
measure how very conservative leaning users have common ac-
cess to information units with others, we plot their joint exposure
with other groups in Figure 8(c). We observe that very conservative
leaning users have highest joint exposure with conservatives, de-
noting that they are exposed to multiple information units together.
Whereas, they have least joint exposure with very liberal leaning
users, implying that these two groups have access to very different
information units.
4 CONCLUSION
In this position paper, we proposed five measures of information
segregation motivated by the residential segregation measures pro-
posed in literature. Then, using these measures, we computed in-
formation segregation among US-based Facebook users. Our future
work lies in evaluating how search / recommender systems are
exposing information to different groups of users, and proposing
mechanisms to keep information segregation to acceptable limits.
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